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Domain 5 · Human- Computer Interaction

5.2Loss of human agency and autonomy

Humans delegating key decisions to AI systems, or AI systems making decisions that diminish human control and autonomy, potentially leading to humans feeling disempowered, losing the ability to shape a fulfilling life trajectory or becoming cognitively enfeebled.

Applicable legal frameworks

Québec

Article 12.1 (droit à l'intervention humaine)

Quebec law on the protection of personal information in force since September 22, 2023, regulating the collection, use, disclosure, and retention of personal information by businesses and public bodies. Includes obligations regarding automated decision-making (Article 12.1).

Canada

AIDA (Bill C-27)Direct (futur)

Surveillance humaine pour systèmes à incidence élevée

Federal bill (C-27) introducing a regulatory framework for high-impact AI systems. Creates an AI and Data Commissioner and imposes assessment, mitigation, and transparency obligations.

UE

AI Act (European Union)Si exposition UE

Article 14 (surveillance humaine)

European regulation establishing a harmonized framework for AI, based on a risk-based approach (unacceptable, high, limited, minimal risk). Relevant for Quebec organizations doing business in the EU.

Quebec sector examples

Services publics

Services publicsOrganisme public

Un système automatisé de recouvrement de créances décide seul des saisies sans intervention humaine, alors que la Loi 25 (article 12.1) garantit un droit à l'intervention humaine.

Recommended mitigations

  • 1.1Board Structure and Oversight

    Governance structures and leadership roles that establish senior management accountability for AI safety and risk management.

  • 1.2Risk Management

    Systematic methods for identifying, assessing, and managing AI-related risks, for comprehensive, organization-wide risk governance.

  • 3.4Phased Deployment

    Implementation protocols that deploy AI systems in stages, requiring safety validation before expanding user access or capabilities.

  • 4.1System Documentation

    Comprehensive documentation protocols that record technical specifications, intended uses, capabilities, and limitations of AI systems to enable informed assessment and governance.

  • 4.6User Rights and Redress

    Frameworks and procedures that enable users to identify and understand interactions with AI systems, report issues, request explanations, and seek redress or remedy when affected by AI systems.

Documented risks (46)

Entries from the AI Risk Repository (MIT) classified under this subdomain. Original content in English.

Entity
Intent
Timing

46 entries

Risk CategoryHogenhout2021

06.12.00Loss of Autonomy

"Delegating decisions to an AI, especially an AI that is not transparent and not contestable, may leave people feeling helpless, subjected to the decision power of a machine."

HumanIntentionalPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryMeek2016

09.02.02Human dignity/respect

"Discrepancies between caste/status based on intelligence may lead to undignified parts of the society—e.g., humans—who are surpassed in intelligence by AI"

OtherOtherPost-deployment
Risk CategoryPaes2023

10.06.00Reduced Autonomy/Responsibility

"AI is providing more and more solutions for complex activities, and by taking advantage of this process, people are becoming able to perform a greater number of activities more quickly and accurately. However, the result of this innovation is enabling choices that were once exclusively human responsibility to be made by AI systems."

OtherIntentionalPost-deployment
Risk CategoryShelby2023

11.04.00Interpersonal Harms

Interpersonal harms capture instances when algorithmic systems adversely shape relations between people or communities.

OtherOtherPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryShelby2023

11.04.01Loss of agency/control

Loss of agency occurs when the use [123, 137] or abuse [142] of algorithmic systems reduces autonomy. One dimension of agency loss is algorithmic profiling [138], through which people are subject to social sorting and discriminatory outcomes to access basic services... presentation of content may lead to “algorithmically informed identity change. . . including [promotion of] harmful person identities (e.g., interests in white supremacy, disordered eating, etc.).” Similarly, for content creators, desire to maintain visibility or prevent shadow banning, may lead to increased conforming of content

OtherOtherPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryShelby2023

11.05.02Cultural harms

Cultural harm has been described as the development or use of algorithmic systems that affects cultural stability and safety, such as “loss of communication means, loss of cultural property, and harm to social values”

AIIntentionalPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategorySolaiman2023

13.02.01Trustworthiness and Autonomy

"Human trust in systems, institutions, and people represented by system outputs evolves as generative AI systems are increasingly embedded in daily life."

HumanOtherPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryWirtz2022

19.02.03Censorship of opinions expressed in the Internet restricts freedom of expression

OtherOtherPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryWirtz2022

19.03.03Loss of supervision and control of business processes

OtherOtherPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryWirtz2022

19.05.06AI systems may undermine human values (e.g., free will, autonomy)

AIOtherPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryWirtz2022

19.06.02Technology obedience and lack of governance through increasing application of AI systems

OtherIntentionalPost-deployment
Risk CategoryWirtz2020

20.03.00AI Society

"AI already shapes many areas of daily life and thus has a strong impact on society and everyday social life. For instance, transportation, education, public safety and surveillance are areas where citizens encounter AI technology (Stone et al., 2016; Thierer et al., 2017). Many are concerned with the subliminal automation of more and more jobs and some people even fear the complete dependence on AI or perceive it as an existential threat to humanity (McGinnis, 2010; Scherer, 2016)."

OtherOtherOther
Risk Sub-CategoryGabriel2024

24.04.04Sociocultural and Political Harms

"These harms interfere with the peaceful organisation of social life, including in the cultural and political spheres. AI assistants may cause or contribute to friction in human relationships either directly, through convincing a user to end certain valuable relationships, or indirectly due to a loss of interpersonal trust due to an increased dependency on assistants. At the societal level, the spread of misinformation by AI assistants could lead to erasure of collective cultural knowledge. In the political domain, more advanced AI assistants could potentially manipulate voters by prompting them to adopt certain political beliefs using targeted propaganda, including via the use of deep fakes. These effects might then have a wider impact on democratic norms and processes. Furthermore, if AI assistants are only available to some people and not others, this could concentrate the capacity to influence, thus exerting undue influence over political discourse and diminishing diversity of political thought. Finally, by tailoring content to user preferences and biases, AI assistants may inadvertently contribute to the creation of echo chambers and filter bubbles, and in turn to political polarisation and extremism. In an experimental setting, LLMs have been shown to successfully sway individuals on policy matters like assault weapon restrictions, green energy or paid parental leave schemes. Indeed, their ability to persuade matches that of humans in many respects."

AIOtherPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryGabriel2024

24.04.05Self-Actualisation Harms

"These harms hinder a person’s ability to pursue a personally fulfilling life. At the individual level, an AI assistant may, through manipulation, cause users to lose control over their future life trajectory. Over time, subtle behavioural shifts can accumulate, leading to significant changes in an individual’s life that may be viewed as problematic. AI systems often seek to understand user preferences to enhance service delivery. However, when continuous optimisation is employed in these systems, it can become challenging to discern whether the system is genuinely learning from user preferences or is steering users towards specific behaviours to optimise its objectives, such as user engagement or click-through rates. Were individuals to rely heavily on AI assistants for decision-making, there is a risk they would relinquish personal agency and entrust important life choices to algorithmic systems, especially if assistants are ‘expert sycophants’ or produce content that sounds convincing and authoritative but is untrustworthy. This may not only contribute to users’ reduced sense of self-trust and personal empowerment; it could also undermine self-determination and hinder the exploration of individual aspirations. At the societal level, were AI assistants to heavily influence public opinion, shape social discourse or mediate democratic processes, they could diminish communities’ collective agency, decision-making power and collective self-determination. This erosion of collective self-determination could hinder the pursuit of societal goals and impede the development of a thriving and participatory democracy

AIIntentionalPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryGabriel2024

24.05.07Disorientation

"Given the capacity to fine-tune on individual preferences and to learn from users, personal AI assistants could fully inhabit the users’ opinion space and only say what is pleasing to the user; an ill that some researchers call ‘sycophancy’ (Park et al., 2023a) or the ‘yea-sayer effect’ (Dinan et al., 2021). A related phenomenon has been observed in automated recommender systems, where consistently presenting users with content that affirms their existing views is thought to encourage the formation and consolidation of narrow beliefs (Du, 2023; Grandinetti and Bruinsma, 2023; see also Chapter 16). Compared to relatively unobtrusive recommender systems, human-like AI assistants may deliver sycophantism in a more convincing and deliberate manner (see Chapter 9). Over time, these tightly woven structures of exchange between humans and assistants might lead humans to inhabit an increasingly atomistic and polarised belief space where the degree of societal disorientation and fragmentation is such that people no longer strive to understand or place value in beliefs held by others."

HumanIntentionalPost-deployment
Risk CategoryGabriel2024

24.06.00Appropriate Relationships

"We anticipate that relationships between users and advanced AI assistants will have several features that are liable to give rise to risks of harm."

OtherOtherPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryGabriel2024

24.06.02Limiting users’ opportunities for personal development and growth

some users look to establish relationships with their AI companions that are free from the hurdles that, in human relationships, derive from dealing with others who have their own opinions, preferences and flaws that may conflict with ours. "AI assistants are likely to incentivise these kinds of ‘frictionless’ relationships (Vallor, 2016) by design if they are developed to optimise for engagement and to be highly personalisable. They may also do so because of accidental undesirable properties of the models that power them, such as sycophancy in large language models (LLMs), that is, the tendency of larger models to repeat back a user’s preferred answer (Perez et al., 2022b). This could be problematic for two reasons. First, if the people in our lives always agreed with us regardless of their opinion or the circumstance, their behaviour would discourage us from challenging our own assumptions, stopping and thinking about where we may be wrong on certain occasions, and reflecting on how we could make better decisions next time. While flattering us in the short term, this would ultimately prevent us from becoming better versions of ourselves. In a similar vein, while technologies that ‘lend an ear’ or work as a sounding board may help users to explore their thoughts further, if AI assistants kept users engaged, flattered and pleased at all times, they could limit users’ opportunities to grow and develop. To be clear, we are not suggesting that all users should want to use their AI assistants as a tool for self-betterment. However, without considering the difference between short-term and long-term benefit, there is a concrete risk that we will only develop technologies that optimise for users’ immediate interests and preferences, hence missing out on the opportunity to develop something that humans could use to support their personal development if so they wish (see Chapters 5 and 6). "Second, users may become accustomed to having frictionless interactions with AI assistants, or at least to encounter the amount of friction that is calibrated to their comfort level and preferences, rather than genuine friction that comes from bumping up against another person’s resistance to one’s will or demands. In this way, they may end up expecting the same absence of tensions from their relationships with fellow humans (Vallor, 2016). Indeed, users seeking frictionless relationships may ‘retreat’ into digital relationships with their AIs, thus forgoing opportunities to engage with others. This may not only heighten the risk of unhealthy dependence (explored below) but also prevent users from doing something else that matters to them in the long term, besides developing their relationships with their assistants. This risk can be exacerbated by emotionally expressive design features (e.g. an assistant saying ‘I missed you’ or ‘I was worried about you’) and may be particularly acute for vulnerable groups, such as those suffering from persistent loneliness (Alberts and Van Kleek, 2023; see Chapter 10).""

OtherIntentionalPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryGabriel2024

24.06.04Generating material dependence without adequate commitment to user needs

"In addition to emotional dependence, user–AI assistant relationships may give rise to material dependence if the relationships are not just emotionally difficult but also materially costly to exit. For example, a visually impaired user may decide not to register for a healthcare assistance programme to support navigation in cities on the grounds that their AI assistant can perform the relevant navigation functions and will continue to operate into the future. Cases like these may be ethically problematic if the user’s dependence on the AI assistant, to fulfil certain needs in their lives, is not met with corresponding duties for developers to sustain and maintain the assistant’s functions that are required to meet those needs (see Chapters 15). "Indeed, power asymmetries can exist between developers of AI assistants and users that manifest through developers’ power to make decisions that affect users’ interests or choices with little risk of facing comparably adverse consequences. For example, developers may unintentionally create circumstances in which users become materially dependent on AI assistants, and then discontinue the technology (e.g. because of market dynamics or regulatory changes) without taking appropriate steps to mitigate against potential harms to the user." "The issue is particularly salient in contexts where assistants provide services that are not merely a market commodity but are meant to assist users with essential everyday tasks (e.g. a disabled person’s independent living) or serve core human needs (e.g. the need for love and companionship). This is what happened with Luka’s decision to discontinue certain features of Replika AIs in early 2023. As a Replika user put it: ‘But [Replikas are] also not trivial fungible goods [... ] They also serve a very specific human-centric emotional purpose: they’re designed to be friends and companions, and fill specific emotional needs for their owners’ (Gio, 2023)." "In these cases, certain duties plausibly arise on the part of AI assistant developers. Such duties may be more extensive than those typically shouldered by private companies, which are often in large part confined to fiduciary duties towards shareholders (Mittelstadt, 2019). To understand these duties, we can again take inspiration from certain professions that engage with vulnerable individuals, such as medical professionals or therapists, and who are bound by fiduciary responsibilities, particularly a duty of care, in the exercise of their profession. While we do not argue that the same framework of responsibilities applies directly to the development of AI assistants, we believe that if AI assistants are so capable that users become dependent on them in multiple domains of life, including to meet needs that are essential for a happy and productive existence, then the moral considerations underpinning those professional norms plausibly apply to those who create these technologies as well." "In particular, for user–AI assistant relationships to be appropriate despite the potential for material dependence on the technology, developers should exercise care towards users when developing and deploying AI assistants. This means that, at the very least, they should take on the responsibility to meet users’ needs and so take appropriate steps to mitigate against user harms if the service requires discontinuation. Developers and providers can also be attentive and responsive towards those needs by, for example, deploying participatory approaches to learn from users about their needs (Birhane et al., 2022). Finally, these entities should try and ensure they have competence to meet those needs, for example by partnering with relevant experts, or refrain from developing technologies meant to address them when such competence is missing (especially in very complex and sensitive spheres of human life like mental health)."

HumanIntentionalPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryGabriel2024

24.09.03Collective action problems

"Collective action problems are ubiquitous in our society (Olson Jr, 1965). They possess an incentive structure in which society is best served if everyone cooperates, but where an individual can achieve personal gain by choosing to defect while others cooperate. The way we resolve these problems at many scales is highly complex and dependent on a deep understanding of the intricate web of social interactions that forms our culture and imprints on our individual identities and behaviours (Ostrom, 2010). Some collective action problems can be resolved by codifying a law, for instance the social dilemma of whether or not to pay for an item in a shop. The path forward here is comparatively easy to grasp, from the perspective of deploying an AI assistant: we need to build these standards into the model as behavioural constraints. Such constraints would need to be imposed by a regulator or agreed upon by practitioners, with suitable penalties applied should the constraint be violated so that no provider had the incentive to secure an advantage for users by defecting on their behalf. However, many social dilemmas, from the interpersonal to the global, resist neat solutions codified as laws. For example, to what extent should each individual country stop using polluting energy sources? Should I pay for a ticket to the neighbourhood fireworks show if I can see it perfectly well from the street? The solutions to such problems are deeply related to the wider societal context and co-evolve with the decisions of others. Therefore, it is doubtful that one could write down a list of constraints a priori that would guarantee ethical AI assistant behaviour when faced with these kinds of issues. From the perspective of a purely user-aligned AI assistant, defection may appear to be the rational course of action. Only with an understanding of the wider societal impact, and of the ability to co-adapt with other actors to reach a better equilibrium for all, can an AI assistant make more nuanced – and socially beneficial – recommendations in these situations. This is not merely a hypothetical situation; it is well-known that the targeted provision of online information can drive polarisation and echo chambers (Milano et al., 2021; Burr et al., 2018; see Chapter 16) when the goal is user engagement rather than user well-being or the cohesion of wider society (see Chapter 6). Similarly, automated ticket buying software can undermine fair pricing by purchasing a large number of tickets for resale at a profit, thus skewing the market in a direction that profits the software developers at the expense of the consumer (Courty, 2019). User-aligned AI assistants have the potential to exacerbate these problems, because they will endow a large set of users with a powerful means of enacting self-interest without necessarily abiding by the social norms or reputational incentives that typically curb self-interested behaviour (Ostrom, 2000; see Chapter 5). Empowering ever-better personalisation of content and enaction of decisions purely for the fulfilment of the principal’s desires runs ever greater risks of polarisation, market distortion and erosion of the social contract. This danger has long been known, finding expression in myth (e.g. Ovid’s account of the Midas touch) and fable (e.g. Aesop’s tale of the tortoise and the eagle), not to mention in political economics discourse on the delicate braiding of the social fabric and the free market (Polanyi, 1944). Following this cautionary advice, it is important that we ascertain how to endow AI assistants with social norms in a way that generalises to unseen situations and which is responsive to the emergence of new norms over time, thus preventing a user from having their every wish granted. AI assistant technology offers opportunities to explore new solutions to collective action problems. Users may volunteer to share information so that networked AI assistants can predict future outcomes and make Pareto-improving choices for all, for example by routing vehicles to reduce traffic congestion (Varga, 2022) or by scheduling energy-intensive processes in the home to make the best use of green electricity (Fiorini and Aiello, 2022). AI assistants might play the role of mediators, providing a new mechanism by which human groups can self-organise to achieve public investment (Koster et al., 2022) or to reach political consensus (Small et al., 2023). Resolving collective action problems often requires a critical mass of cooperators (Marwell and Oliver, 1993). By augmenting human social interactions, AI assistants may help to form and strengthen the weak ties needed to overcome this start-up problem (Centola, 2013)."

HumanOtherOther
Risk Sub-CategoryNah2023

33.01.03Over-reliance

"The apparent convenience and powerfulness of ChatGPT could result in overreliance by its users, making them trust the answers provided by ChatGPT. Compared with traditional search engines that provide multiple information sources for users to make personal judgments and selections, ChatGPT generates specific answers for each prompt. Although utilizing ChatGPT has the advantage of increasing efficiency by saving time and effort, users could get into the habit of adopting the answers without rationalization or verification. Over-reliance on generative AI technology can impede skills such as creativity, critical thinking, and problem-solving (Iskender, 2023) as well as create human automation bias due to habitual acceptance of generative AI recommendations (Van Dis et al., 2023)"

OtherIntentionalOther

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