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Domain 3 · Misinformation

3.2Pollution of information ecosystem and loss of consensus reality

Highly personalized AI-generated misinformation creating “filter bubbles” where individuals only see what matches their existing beliefs, undermining shared reality, weakening social cohesion and political processes.

Applicable legal frameworks

Québec

Principes 1 (bien-être) et 5 (participation démocratique)

Ethical declaration based on 10 principles (well-being, respect for autonomy, privacy protection, etc.). A recognized Quebec reference.

UE

AI Act (European Union)Si exposition UE

Article 50 (filigranes)

European regulation establishing a harmonized framework for AI, based on a risk-based approach (unacceptable, high, limited, minimal risk). Relevant for Quebec organizations doing business in the EU.

Quebec sector examples

Médias

MédiasSalle de presse

Un quotidien québécois publie sans le vouloir une fausse citation d'une élue, générée par un assistant IA, qui se propage dans les réseaux sociaux avant rétractation.

Recommended mitigations

  • 2.4Content Safety Controls

    Technical systems and processes that detect, filter, and label AI-generated content to identify misuse and enable content provenance tracking.

  • 3.1Testing and Audits

    Systematic internal and external evaluations that examine AI systems, infrastructure, and compliance processes to identify risks, verify safety, and ensure performance meets standards.

  • 3.5Post-Deployment Monitoring

    Processes for continuous monitoring of AI behavior, user interactions, and societal impacts after deployment to detect misuse, emerging dangerous capabilities, and harmful effects.

  • 4.2Risk Disclosure

    Formal reporting protocols and notification systems that communicate information on risks, mitigation plans, safety assessments, and significant AI-related activities to enable external oversight and inform stakeholders.

  • 4.4Governance Disclosure

    Formal disclosure mechanisms that communicate governance structures, decision-making frameworks, and safety commitments to increase transparency and enable external oversight of high-stakes AI decisions.

Documented risks (22)

Entries from the AI Risk Repository (MIT) classified under this subdomain. Original content in English.

Entity
Intent
Timing

22 entries

Risk CategoryHogenhout2021

06.05.00Erosion of Society

"With online news feeds, both on websites and social media platforms, the news is now highly personalized for us. We risk losing a shared sense of reality, a basic solidarity."

AIIntentionalPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryWeidinger2023

18.02.03Pollution of information ecosystem

"Contaminating publicly available information with false or inaccurate information"

AIOtherPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryGabriel2024

24.11.01Entrenched viewpoints and reduced political efficacy

"Design choices such as greater personalisation of AI assistants and efforts to align them with human preferences could also reinforce people’s pre-existing biases and entrench specific ideologies. Increasingly agentic AI assistants trained using techniques such as reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) and with the ability to access and analyse users’ behavioural data, for example, may learn to tailor their responses to users’ preferences and feedback. In doing so, these systems could end up producing partial or ideologically biased statements in an attempt to conform to user expectations, desires or preferences for a particular worldview (Carroll et al., 2022). Over time, this could lead AI assistants to inadvertently reinforce people’s tendency to interpret information in a way that supports their own prior beliefs (‘confirmation bias’), thus making them more entrenched in their own views and more resistant to factual corrections (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). At the societal level, this could also exacerbate the problem of epistemic fragmentation – a breakdown of shared knowledge, where individuals have conflicting understandings of reality and do not share or engage with each other’s beliefs – and further entrench specific ideologies. Excessive trust and overreliance on hyperpersonalised AI assistants could become especially problematic if people ended up deferring entirely to these systems to perform tasks in domains they do not have expertise in or to take consequential decisions on their behalf (see Chapter 12). For example, people may entrust an advanced AI assistant that is familiar with their political views and personal preferences to help them find trusted election information, guide them through their political choices or even vote on their behalf, even if doing so might go against their own or society’s best interests. In the more extreme cases, these developments may hamper the normal functioning of democracies, by decreasing people’s civic competency and reducing their willingness and ability to engage in productive political debate and to participate in public life (Sullivan and Transue, 1999)."

AIIntentionalPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryGabriel2024

24.11.02Degraded and homogenised information environments

"Beyond this, the widespread adoption of advanced AI assistants for content generation could have a number of negative consequences for our shared information ecosystem. One concern is that it could result in a degradation of the quality of the information available online. Researchers have already observed an uptick in the amount of audiovisual misinformation, elaborate scams and fake websites created using generative AI tools (Hanley and Durumeric, 2023). As more and more people turn to AI assistants to autonomously create and disseminate information to public audiences at scale, it may become increasingly difficult to parse and verify reliable information. This could further threaten and complicate the status of journalists, subject-matter experts and public information sources. Over time, a proliferation of spam, misleading or low-quality synthetic content in online spaces could also erode the digital knowledge commons – the shared knowledge resources accessible to everyone on the web, such as publicly accessible data repositories (Huang and Siddarth, 2023). At its extreme, such degradation could also end up skewing people’s view of reality and scientific consensus, make them more doubtful of the credibility of all information they encounter and shape public discourse in unproductive ways. Moreover, in an online environment saturated with AI-generated content, more and more people may become reliant on personalised, highly capable AI assistants for their informational needs. This also runs the risk of homogenising the type of information and ideas people encounter online (Epstein et al., 2023)."

HumanIntentionalPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryGabriel2024

24.11.05Entrenching specific ideologies

"AI assistants may provide ideologically biased or otherwise partial information in attempting to align to user expectations. In doing so, AI assistants may reinforce people’s pre-existing biases and compromise productive political debate."

AIIntentionalPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryGabriel2024

24.11.06Eroding trust and undermining shared knowledge

"AI assistants may contribute to the spread of large quantities of factually inaccurate and misleading content, with negative consequences for societal trust in information sources and institutions, as individuals increasingly struggle to discern truth from falsehood."

AIOtherPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryEPIC2023

31.01.05Clickbait and feeding the surveillance advertising ecosystem

"Beyond misinformation and disinformation, generative AI can be used to create clickbait headlines and articles, which manipulate how users navigate the internet and applications. For example, generative AI is being used to create full articles, regardless of their veracity, grammar, or lack of common sense, to drive search engine optimization and create more webpages that users will click on. These mechanisms attempt to maximize clicks and engagement at the truth’s expense, degrading users’ experiences in the process. Generative AI continues to feed this harmful cycle by spreading misinformation at faster rates, creating headlines that maximize views and undermine consumer autonomy."

OtherOtherOther
Risk CategoryHendrycks2022

35.03.00Eroded epistemics

Strong AI may... enable personally customized disinformation campaigns at scale... AI itself could generate highly persuasive arguments that invoke primal human responses and inflame crowds... d undermine collective decision-making, radicalize individuals, derail moral progress, or erode consensus reality

AIOtherPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryTC2602024

45.02.09Cognitive risks (Risks of amplifying the effects of "information cocoons")

"AI can be extensively utilized for customized information services, collecting user information, and analyzing types of users, their needs, intentions, preferences, habits, and even mainstream public awareness over a certain period. It can then be used to offer formulaic and tailored information and services, aggravating the effects of "information cocoons.""

HumanIntentionalPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryMaas2023

53.04.03Impacts on “epistemic security” and the information environment

-

AIIntentionalPost-deployment
Risk CategoryClarke2023

55.04.00Worsened epistemic processes for society

"Epistemic processes and problem solving: we currently see more reasons to be concerned about AI worsening society's epistemic processes than reasons to be optimistic about AI helping us better solve problems as a society. For example, increased use of content selection algorithms could drive epistemic insularity and a decline in trust in credible multipartisan sources, which reducing our ability to deal with important long-term threats and challenges such as pandemics and climate change."

HumanIntentionalPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryClarke2023

55.04.01AI contributes to increased online polarisation

"One of the most significant commercial uses of current AI systems is in the content recommendation algorithms of social media companies, and there are already concerns that this is contributing to worsened polarisation online"

HumanIntentionalPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryClarke2023

55.04.04Widespread use of persuasive tools contributes to splintered epistemic communities

"Even without deliberate misuse, widespread use of powerful persuasion tools could have negative impacts. If such tools were used by many different groups to advance many different ideas, we could see the world splintering into isolated “epistemic communities”, with little room for dialogue or transfer between communities. A similar scenario could emerge via the increasing personalisation of people’s online experiences—in other words, we may see a continuation of the trend towards “filter bubbles” and “echo chambers”, driven by content selection algorithms, that some argue is already happening [3, 25, 51]."

HumanIntentionalOther
Risk Sub-CategoryClarke2023

55.04.05Reduced decision-making capacity as a result of decreased trust in information

"In addition, the increased awareness of these trends in information production and distribution could make it harder for anyone to evaluate the trustworthiness of any information source, reducing overall trust in information. In all of these scenarios, it would be much harder for humanity to make good decisions on important issues, particularly due to declining trust in credible multipartisan sources, which could hamper attempts at cooperation and collective action. The vaccine and mask hesitancy that exacerbated Covid-19, for example, were likely the result of insufficient trust in public health advice [71]. These concerns could be especially worrying if they play out during another major world crisis. We could imagine an even more virulent pandemic, where actors exploit the opportunity to spread misinformation and disinformation to further their own ends. This could lead to dangerous practices, a significantly increased burden on health services, and much more catastrophic outcomes [64]."

OtherOtherPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryAbercrombie2024

58.03.08Radicalisation

"Radicalisation - Adoption of extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations due to the nature or misuse of an algorithmic system, potentially resulting in abuse, violence, or terrorism."

OtherOtherPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryAbercrombie2024

58.07.07Information degradation

"Information degradation - Creation or spread of false, hallucinatory, low-quality, misleading, or inaccurate information that degrades the information ecosystem and causes people to develop false or inaccurate perceptions, decisions and beliefs; or to lose trust in accurate information."

AIOtherPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryAbercrombie2024

58.08.05Institutional trust loss

"Institutional trust loss - Erosion of trust in public institutions and weakened checks and balances due to mis/disinformation, influence operations, over-dependence on technology, etc."

OtherOtherPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryUuk2025

61.02.20Detection challenges in content

"The difficulty in distinguishing synthetic content from authentic material adds to information risks."

OtherOtherPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryLi2025

66.03.02Pollution of information ecosystems

"Contaminating publicly available information with false or inaccurate information (i.e., the generative tool's output is disseminated beyond the end user)"

OtherOtherPost-deployment
Risk Sub-CategoryLi2025

66.03.03Erosion of trust in public information

"Eroding trust in public information and knowledge"

OtherOtherOther

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